[menog] Spoofer Report for MENOG for Oct 2019

[CAIDA Spoofer Project]

In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem.

Inferred improvements during Oct 2019:
   ASN Name                                           Fixed-By
202365 Chronos                                        2019-10-27
 60721 bursabil                                       2019-10-27

Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Oct 2019:
   ASN Name                           First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
 25019 SAUDINETSTC                       2016-07-06   2019-10-30
  8452 TE                                2016-09-23   2019-10-31
 24863 LINKdotNET                        2017-03-27   2019-10-31
  9121 TTNet                             2017-07-14   2019-10-16
 15802 DU-AS1                            2018-09-22   2019-10-27
 58224 TCI                               2018-10-22   2019-10-24
202365 Chronos                           2019-07-10   2019-10-27
  8966 Etisalat                          2019-08-08   2019-10-28
203735 Net-Tech-Ltd                      2019-10-12   2019-10-31

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1

Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info at caida.org