[menog] survey on BGP prefix hijacking
sermpezis at ics.forth.gr
Tue May 9 10:26:17 UTC 2017
[apologies for cross-posting]
Dear MENOG Community,
BGP prefix hijacking remains a problem for Internet routing, despite the
(partial) use of RPKI or detection services. We would like to hear your
opinions on BGP prefix hijacking (concerns, existing defenses, needs,
etc.) that would help us research new defense mechanisms both for its
detection and mitigation.
Please help us by answering this short (< 10min, 21 questions) and
Survey URL: http://tinyurl.com/hijack-survey
*** The survey ***
This survey is part of a joint research effort by CAIDA (www.caida.org)
and the ICS-FORTH (www.ics.forth.gr) research institute, to study (a)
operator awareness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks/incidents, (b)
presently used defenses against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the
willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may
hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses.
We expect the findings of this survey to increase the understanding of
existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, as
well as help us design and implement new defense mechanisms that we will
present to the operator and scientific communities.
A summary of the aggregate results will be published as a part of an
Thank you in advance, and we look forward to your responses!
Alberto (CAIDA) and Pavlos (ICS-FORTH)
INSPIRE group (http://www.inspire.edu.gr/)
Telecommunications and Networks Laboratory (TNL)
ICS, FORTH, Greece
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Menog