[menog] Spoofer Report for MENOG for Sep 2023

[CAIDA Spoofer Project]

In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem.

Inferred improvements during Sep 2023:
 none inferred

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Sep 2023:
ASN    Name                           First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
8452   TE                                2016-09-23   2023-09-26
5384   EMIRATES-INTERNET                 2017-02-17   2023-09-13
51375  VIVABH                            2023-03-06   2023-09-26
196921 BWireless-Kuwait                  2023-03-12   2023-09-28
5416                                     2023-09-28   2023-09-28

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1

Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info at caida.org